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This	paper	revisits	canonical	thinking	on	international	financial	centres	(IFCs)	that	
understands	them	as	being	primarily	sustained	through:	market	liquidity;	economies	
of	competition	and	cooperation	between	financial	and	related	professional	services;	
and	acting	as	interpretative	nodes	within	global	finance.		In	contrast,	I	explore	the	
implications	of	foregrounding	questions	of	power	and	politics	in	the	(re)production	
of	IFCs.		Drawing	on	the	case	of	the	development	of	offshore	renminbi	markets	in	
London’s	financial	district,	I	argue	the	state	plays	a	vital,	yet	comparatively	
neglected,	role	in	shaping	the	development	and	changing	nature	of	international	
financial	centres.		In	so	doing,	the	paper	calls	for	work	in	economic	geography	and	
cognate	social	sciences	to	understand	finance	as	a	political	as	well	as	an	economic,	
social	and	cultural	relation.		
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Introduction	
	
In	October	2015,	the	Financial	Times	carried	the	headline	‘Chinese	financial	
institutions	grow	closer	to	the	heart	of	London’	(Financial	Times,	2015a).		The	article	
documented	London’s	rise	as	the	first	and	leading	western	offshore	centre	(beyond	
mainland	China)	for	financial	products	and	markets	denominated	in	the	Chinese	
currency	–	the	renminbi	(RMB).		The	article	was	accompanied	by	a	picture	of	the	
Chinese	flag	flying	in	the	centre	of	London’s	historic	financial	district	with	the	
financial	offices	of	Canary	Wharf	in	the	background.		This	image	clearly	symbolises	
the	marked	changes	the	internationalisation	of	the	RMB	is	currently	bringing	about	
within	the	international	financial	system.		Prior	to	2004,	RMB	denominated	trading	
was	not	allowed	outside	China	and	the	RMB	had	virtually	no	international	influence.		
Subsequently,	the	Chinese	monetary	and	financial	authorities	have	pursued	a	
carefully	managed	policy	of	internationalisation	such	that	the	RMB	is	now	the	fifth	
most-used	currency	globally	for	international	payments	and	was	selected	to	join	the	
International	Monetary	Fund’s	basked	of	global	reserve	currencies	in	November	
2015	(IMF	2015).		Nevertheless,	the	process	of	internationalisation	and	associated	
financial	services	sector	reform	within	China	has	not	been	without	its	difficulties.		
Most	notably,	the	uncertainties	surrounding	the	Chinese	financial	system	were	
demonstrated	by	the	Shanghai	stock	market	crisis	in	the	summer	of	2015	in	which	
trading	only	resumed	following	state	intervention	that	was	estimated	to	cost	more	
than	US$800	billion	of	public	and	private	funds	(Reuters	2015).		Unsurprisingly,	there	
are	doubts	as	to	whether	such	large-scale	rescue	operations	will	remain	sustainable	
in	the	future.	
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In	this	paper,	I	use	the	case	of	the	London’s	development	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre	
to	revisit	work	in	economic	geography	and	cognate	social	sciences	on	the	
(re)production	and	development	of	international	financial	centres	(IFCs).		A	vibrant	
literature	has	developed	in	this	respect	through	a	range	of	conceptual	approaches	
and	empirical	research	sites.		This	includes:	intensive	analysis	of	the	history	of	
leading	financial	centres	in	Europe	and	North	America	(Cassis,	2010;	Kynaston	2012);	
relational	and	networked	based	accounts	of	the	continued	dominance	of	a	small	
number	of	financial	centres,	notably	New	York	and	London	(Beaverstock	et	al	2000;	
Faulconbridge	2004;	Sassen	2000);	and	work	on	the	localisation	advantages	afforded	
to	financial	institutions	by	co-locating	within	financial	centres	(Clark	and	O’Connor	
1997;	Porteous	1999;	Tickell	2000;	Thrift	1994).		Collectively,	this	work	has	refuted	
claims	that	information	technology	and	the	associated	virtualisation	of	stock	
exchanges	in	particular	would	lead	to	the	‘end	of	geography’	associated	with	a	
decreasing	importance	of	IFCs	(on	which	see	O’Brien	1992).			
	
This	paper	uses	the	case	of	RMB	internationalisation	in	London	to	develop	a	
sympathetic	critique	of	this	literature,	arguing	that	research	needs	to	better	
understand	the	role	of	the	state,	and	financial	and	monetary	authorities	in	
particular,	in	shaping	the	reproduction	and	development	of	international	financial	
centres.		This	is	not	to	say	that	the	state	is	entirely	absent	from	extant	research.		For	
example,	much	of	the	early	work	on	the	geographies	of	money	and	finance	and	
related	fields	was	concerned	with	understanding	the	implications	of	the	collapse	of	
the	Bretton	Woods	agreement	of	pegged	exchange	rates	from	the	1970s	onwards	
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for	the	governance	arrangements	of	global	finance,	particularly	the	potential	for	a	
decline	in	state	power	within	financial	markets	(Strange	1988;	Leyshon	1992;	Thrift	
and	Leyshon	1994;	Leyshon	and	Thrift	1997,	Leyshon	and	Tickell	1994).		
Furthermore,	whilst	offshore	financial	centres	are	frequently	identified	in	the	media	
as	being	places	beyond	state	control,	research	has	shown	the	vital	role	played	by	
state-led	regulation	in	their	creation	and	reproduction	(Hudson,	1998;	Roberts	1995;	
Palan	2006).	Despite	this	work,	much	of	the	recent	research	on	IFCs	has	emphasised	
the	networked	properties	of	the	socio-spatial	practices	of	advanced	producer	service	
firms	(including	finance	and	law	firms	in	particular)	that	serve	to	sustain	the	
importance	of	IFCs	as	such	centres	act	as	interpretative	nodes	for	knowledge	
creating,	reproduction	and	exchange	within	such	networks	(Beaverstock	2002;	2004;	
Beaverstock	et	al	2000).	
	
Understanding	these	inter-IFC	firm	networks	is	clearly	important	given	the	
implications	of	such	connections	for,	for	example,	regulatory	change	following	the	
financial	crisis	(Wojcik	2013).		Moreover,	measures	of	connectivity	between	financial	
centres,	including	inter-firm	relations,	have	become	important	components	in	the	
numerous	rankings	of	financial	centres	produced	in	both	academic	and	practitioner	
communities		(Tschoegl,	2000;	Choi	et	al.,	2003;	Z/Yen	2016).		However,	in	this	
paper,	I	use	the	case	of	RMB	internationalisation	to	demonstrate	how	state	
intervention	is	vital	in	creating	the	conditions	under	which	these	financial	networks	
can	develop	and	thrive.		In	particular,	I	suggest	that	foregrounding	the	role	of	the	
state	in	the	(re)production	of	IFCs	demands	a	shift	in	the	geographical	imagination	
used	to	study	financial	centres	from	its	current	emphasis	on	networks	and	
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relationality	to	one	more	sensitive	to	the	territorial	qualities	of	financial	centres	and	
the	ways	in	which	territories	are	co-produced	through	financial	networks	(see	also	
Budd	1995;	Van	Meeteren	and	Bassens	2016).		Drawing	on	the	increasing	interest	in	
territory	in	economic	geography	and	beyond	(see	for	example	Christophers	2014;	
Elden	2005;	2010;	Sassen	2008),	I	demonstrate	how	the	territorial	construction	of	
London’s	financial	district,	understood	as	the	(re)production	of	the	space	of	
London’s	financial	district	through	state	intervention	in	setting	the	institutional	and	
regulatory	parameters	of	legitimate	financial	activity,	are	vitally	important	in	
understanding	the	development	of	offshore	RMB	markets	in	London.	
	
This	argument	is	important	because	it	shows	how	work	on	IFCs	can	respond	to	calls	
for	the	development	of	more	politically	sensitive	accounts	of	the	geographies	of	
global	finance	more	generally	(Agnew	2009;	Hall	2011;	Wojcik	2013;	Wójcik	et	al	
2016).		It	also	offers	the	potential	to	place	IFCs	more	centrally	within	longstanding	
debates	concerning	the	relationship	between	state	power,	governance	and	
globalisation	(Held	and	McGrew	2002;	Thrift	and	Leyshon	1994;	Leyshon	and	Thrift	
1997).		In	particular,	I	show	how	state	power	remains	important,	if	not	increasingly	
so,	within	global	finance.		This	has	been	documented	at	the	level	inter-state	relations	
through,	for	example,	work	on	currency	competition	within	the	international	
monetary	system	(see	Cohen	2015;	Eichengreen	2011).	This	paper	offers	a	
complimentary	reading	of	the	importance	of	state	power	at	the	less	well-understood	
scale	of	financial	districts	that	underpin	global	finance.		I	develop	this	argument	over	
four	further	sections.	Next	I	locate	IFCs	within	broader	debates	concerning	the	
relationship	between	networks	and	territory	in	economic	geography	and	cognate	
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social	sciences.		The	third	section	of	the	paper	introduces	the	process	of	RMB	
internationalisation	and	the	role	of	offshore	RMB	centres	within	this.		In	the	fourth	
section	I	examine	how	London’s	financial	district	served	as	a	‘territorial	fix’	
(Christophers	2014)	for	state	and	private	sector	interests	in	China	and	London	
concerned	with	RMB	internationalisation	and	the	wider	development	of	London	as	
an	IFC.		I	conclude	by	reflecting	on	the	significance	of	this	analysis	for	theoretical	
understandings	of	the	changing	political	and	economic	geographies	of	IFCs,	the	role	
of	states	and	regulators	within	this	and	the	impacts	of	RMB	internationalisation	on	
the	wider	geographies	of	the	international	financial	system.	
	
Placing	financial	centres	within	the	politics	of	global	finance	
	
Whilst	Faulconbridge	et	al	(2007:281)	rightly	argue	that	extant	work	across	a	range	
of	disciplines	fails	to	provide	a	‘consistent	analytical	framework’	for	explaining	the	
continued	importance	of	a	small	number	of	financial	centres,	common	foci	have	
emerged	within	the	interdisciplinary	literature	on	financial	centres.		As	Cassis	(2010)	
notes,	the	majority	of	these	explanations	centre	on	the	identification	of	external	
economies	of	scale	available	to	firms	and	financial	institutions	beyond	their	firm	
boundaries	through	being	co-located	with	other,	similar	actors	with	whom	they	can	
form	relations	of	competition	and	cooperation.		Three	such	economies	of	scale	and	
their	associated	agglomeration	benefits	are	particularly	significant.	First,	successful	
financial	districts	are	built	on	highly	liquid	financial	markets	(Faulconbridge	et	al	
2007).		Second,	the	clustering	of	financial	firms	within	financial	centres	gives	rise	to	
‘buzz’	between	financiers	(Storper	and	Venables	2004).		This	buzz,	built	around	
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dense	inter-personal	and	inter-firm	relations,	is	important	because	it	facilitates	
processes	of	innovation	and	the	production	of	new	financial	products	by	overcoming	
the	knowledge	asymmetries	between	financiers	and	their	clients	that	are	associated	
with	the	bespoke	qualities	of	many	financial	products	and	services	(see	Clark	and	
O’Connor	1997).		Third,	IFCs	typically	attract	the	highly	skilled	labour	force	that	is	
needed	to	work	in	this	information	rich	environment	(Beaverstock	and	Hall	2012).		In	
addition	to	this	work	on	economies	of	scale,	connections	between	IFCs	have	also	
been	widely	identified	as	important	factors	in	explaining	the	continued	importance	
of	a	small	number	of	such	centres.		This	includes	work	on:	the	so-called	NY-LON	
connection	between	New	York	and	London		(Beaverstock	2004);	the	changing	
landscape	of	European	financial	centres	(Faulconbridge	2004)	and	emerging	and	
rapidly	developing	new	forms	of	connectivity	such	as	in	Asia	(Lai	2012).		
	
Taken	together,	therefore,	the	extant	literature	on	IFCs	follows	the	wider	
development	of	relational	and	networked	based	approaches	to	the	economy	(on	
which	see	Bathelt	and	Gluckler	2003;	Yeung	2005)	to	understand	them	within	“a	
spatially	distributed	network	of	money	and	power,	where	the	global	and	local	
processes	intermesh	and	run	into	each	other	in	a	variety	of	ways”	(Wójcik,	2013:	2).		
However,	the	relationship	between	networks	and	the	places	and	spaces	in	which	
they	become	grounded,	interpreted	and	acted	upon	is	a	longstanding	concern	within	
economic	geography,	extending	well	beyond	work	on	IFCs	(Dicken	1994;	Scott	1998;	
Storper	1997).		In	this	paper,	I	want	to	suggest	that	whilst	by	no	means	ignoring	the	
territorial	basis	of	IFCs,	the	relative	balance	of	work	on	such	centres	has	taken	
networks	and	flows	of	people,	knowledge,	information	and	capital	as	their	starting	
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point	and	hence,	understandings	of	how	these	networks	are	grounded	and	reworked	
in	particular	places	has	been	comparatively	neglected	(see	Van	Meeteren	and	
Bassens	2016).		In	particular,	I	am	interested	in	how	this	focus	has	meant	that	the	
governance	of	such	networks,	and	particularly	the	role	of	the	state	in	such	activities,	
remain	overlooked.			
	
A	number	of	interventions,	including	but	not	limited	to	work	in	finance,	provide	a	
valuable	way	of	beginning	to	develop	a	more	comprehensive	understanding	of	the	
role	of	the	state	in	reproducing	and	maintaining	IFCs.		In	order	to	do	this,	I	take	as	
my	starting	point	the	renewed	interest	in	territory	within	geography	more	generally.		
This	work	understands	territory	as	a	way	of	making	and	managing	space	through	
legal	and	other	regulatory	frameworks	(Elden	2005;	2010).		When	applied	to	the	
case	of	economic	geography,	this	echoes	earlier	work	that	is	concerned	with	‘the	
sets	of	institutions,	rules,	and	conventions	that	form	the	regulatory	context	of	
industrial	systems,	firms,	and	territories’	Dicken	and	Malmberg	2001:	347)	and	more	
recent	concerns	to	understand	‘territorial	development’	within	recent	work	in	the	
global	productions	literature	(Yeung	and	Coe	2015).	This	work	is	important	because	
it	signals	the	importance	of	attending	to	the	mulitscalar	connections	implicated	in	
the	making	of	particular	territories	(see	also	Amin	1998).			
	
In	terms	of	work	on	the	geographies	of	finance,	this	approach	has	been	developed	
through	the	longstanding	interest	in	offshore	finance	that	emphasises	the	ways	in	
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which	offshore	space	is	constructed	through	the	variation	of	state	sovereignty	across	
space	(Palan	2006;	Roberts	1995;	Hudson	1998).		Meanwhile,	Pike	and	Pollard	
(2010:38)	argue	that	the	vast	literature	on	financialisation	needs	to	remain	attentive	
to	the	‘tensions	between	territorial	and	relational	conceptions	of	space	and	place’.		
Christophers	(2014:755)	has	recently	taken	this	analysis	a	stage	further	by	examining	
how	“modern	capitalism	is	constantly	in	the	process	of	enacting	territorial	fixes:	
constituting,	segmenting,	differentiating	and	extracting	value	from	actively	
territorialized	markets	at	a	range	of	geographical	scales.	This	provides	a	valuable	
extension	of	Harvey’s	(1982)	understanding	of	spatial	fixes	by	demonstrating	how	
capitalism	seeks	to	overcome	its	crisis	prone	tendencies	not	only	through	spatial	
expansion	but	also	through	the	remaking	of	space	through	regulatory	and	other	
political	interventions.		In	what	follows,	I	examine	the	role	of	the	state	in	using	IFCs	
as	‘territorial	fixes’	within	the	international	financial	system	through	regulatory	
changes	that	aim	to	(re)produce	their	institutional	arrangements	of	rules,	informal	
customs	and	practices.		
	
I	illustrate	this	approach	through	focusing	on	how	London’s	financial	district	was	
used	as	a	territorial	fix	for	financial	and	monetary	authorities	in	both	China	and	
London	in	its	development	as	the	first	and	leading	western	offshore	RMB	centre	
from	2011	onwards.	The	analysis	reports	on	original	empirical	research	conducted	in	
London	and	Beijing	into	London’s	development	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre	since	
2011	and	the	development	of	an	RMB	bond	market	in	London	in	particular.		The	
research	involved	two	stages.		First,	desk	based	reviews	were	conducted	into:	official	
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statistics	on	the	development	of	RMB	services	and	functions	in	London	from	both	
London		(including	the	National	Office	for	Statistics,	City	of	London	and	HM	Treasury)	
and	China	(through	the	State	Administration	of	Foreign	Exchange	(SAFE));	and	
analysis	of	press	reports,	Government	press	releases	in	China	and	London	as	they	
relate	to	renminbi	internationalisation	and	the	development	of	RMB	bond	markets	
in	London.		Second,	thirty	semi-structured	interviews	were	conducted	in	London	and	
Beijing	between	September	2014	and	June	2015.		Interviews	were	conducted	with	
financiers	working	in	a	range	of	RMB	product	areas	in	London	and	Beijing	working	in	
Chinese	banks	and	non-Chinese	owned	financial	institutions,	lawyers	working	on	
RMB	products	in	London,	regulators	and	market	commentators	concerned	with	
advancing	understanding	of	RMB	internationalisation	and	London’s	role	within	this	
in	London	and	Beijing.		Interviews	were	conducted	in	English	and	lasted	between	
thirty	minutes	and	two	and	a	half	hours.		All	interviews	were	recorded	and	
transcribed	in	full	before	being	coded	following	grounded	theory	with	key	themes	
being	identified	to	shape	the	coding	process.	
	
Placing	London	within	RMB	internationalisation	
	
In	order	to	understand	how	the	place	specific	socio-spatial	practices	within	London’s	
financial	district	operated	alongside	its	territorial	qualities	in	its	development	as	an	
offshore	RMB	centre,	it	is	important	to	begin	by	situating	London	within	the	wider	
geographies	of	RMB	internationalisation.		It	is	not	easy	to	give	a	precise	start	date	
for	RMB	internationalisation	as	it	has	unfolded	incrementally	through	a	series	of	
policy	changes	initiated	by	the	political	and	financial	authorities	in	Beijing	(Chen	and	
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Cheung	2011;	Walter	and	Howie	2012).		However,	the	early	2000s	marked	an	
important	period	of	financial	policy	liberalisation	(SWIFT	2011),	building	on	the	
broader	internationalisation	of	the	Chinese	economy	(see	Yeung	and	Liu	2008).		For	
example,	in	2006,	the	study	group	within	the	People’s	Bank	of	China	published	a	
report	entitled	‘The	timing,	path	and	strategies	of	RMB	internationalization’	that	
gave	significant	impetus	to	currency	internationalisation	(PBOC	study	group	2006).	
This	report	argued	that	currency	internationalisation	could	enhance	the	
competitiveness	of	the	Chinese	economy.	Moreover,	the	financial	crisis	of	2008	
provided	additional	motivation	for	the	Chinese	government	to	support	RMB	
internationalisation	as	it	sought	to	reduce	China’s	reliance	on	the	US	dollar	in	trade	
relationships	(Walter	and	Howie	2012;	Zhang	2009).			
	
Building	on	these	early	developments,	RMB	internationalisation	can	be	broken	down	
into	three	phases,	following	the	initial	period	of	policy	liberalisation	in	the	early	
2000s	(see	figure	1).		Each	of	these	phases	involved	the	development	of	distinctive	
geographies	of	RMB	internationalisation	associated	with	processes	of	
territorialisation.		These	financial	geographies	have	been	shaped	significantly	by	
regulatory	and	broader	state	intervention	by	financial	authorities	in	Beijing	in	order	
to	address	particular	limitations	associated	with	the	wider	RMB	internationalisation	
project.	
	
As	figure	one	shows,	following	initial	policy	liberalisation,	internationalisation	
focused	on	the	RMB	as	a	form	of	regional	trade	money	through	a	gradual	expansion	
in	the	ways	in	which	the	RMB	could	be	used	to	settle	trade	(Eichengreen	and	Kawai	
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2014;	ASIFMA	2014).	The	Chinese	monetary	authorities	used	a	number	of	initiatives	
to	facilitate	this.	Most	notably,	in	July	2009	a	pilot	RMB	cross	border	trade	
settlement	program	was	launched.		This	program	allowed	importers	in	Shanghai	and	
four	selected	cities	in	Guangdong	(Guangzhou,	Shenzhen,	Zhuhai	and	Dongguan)	to	
settle	cross-border	trades	with	Hong	Kong,	Macau	and	ASEAN	countries	in	RMB.		Up	
until	this	point,	trade	was	typically	settled	in	US	dollars	or	Euros,	leading	to	
significant	transaction	and	hedging	costs	for	Chinese	firms	when	dealing	in	foreign	
currencies.	The	scheme	was	expanded	in	July	2010	to	allow	settlement	in	RMB	for	
firms	operating	in	a	much	broader	range	of	locations	in	China	(including	Beijing	and	
twelve	provinces)	with	any	country	globally,	thereby	marking	a	significant	
geographical	expansion	of	RMB	internationalisation	beyond	south	east	Asia.	
Following	this,	the	proportion	of	China’s	trade	settled	in	RMB	has	grown	from	7%	in	
2011	to	14%	in	2013	(ASIFMA	2014).	
	
[insert	figure	1	here]	
	
Whilst	trade	money	was	the	primary	focus	of	the	initial	stages	RMB	
internationalisation,	by	the	late	2000s,	the	early	stages	of	the	next	phase	of	RMB	
internationalisation	were	being	developed.		This	focused	on	internationalisation	
based	around	the	RMB	as	a	form	of	investment	money	-	an	initiative	that	was	aimed	
at	overcoming	some	of	the	problems	that	were	emerging	following	the	growing	use	
of	RMB	in	global	trade.		In	particular,	concerns	were	emerging	that	companies	
trading	with	China	were	converting	their	RMB	back	into	their	domestic	currency	and	
hence	not	reinvesting	in	mainland	China	(HSBC	2013).		In	response,	a	number	of	
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policy	changes	were	made.		Of	particular	importance	is	the	RMB	Qualified	Foreign	
Institutional	Investor	Program	(RQFII)	that	was	announced	in	2011.	This	program	
allowed	licensed	investors	to	use	RMB	held	offshore	to	invest	in	China,	through	the	
Shanghai	and	Shenzhen	stock	exchanges,	in	financial	products	including	shares,	
bonds,	securities	and	stock	index	futures.		Initially,	all	investments	into	the	Chinese	
mainland	through	this	scheme	had	to	be	made	through	funds	based	in	Hong	Kong.		
However,	from	2013	onwards	the	geography	of	this	was	expanded,	initially	
permitting	investment	through	Singapore	based	funds.		In	2014,	further	
internationalisation	occurred	when	London	was	given	an	RQFII	quota	of	RMB80bn.	
	
[insert	table	1	here]	
	
It	is	at	this	stage	that	the	distinctive	spatial	footprint	of	RMB	internationalisation	
begins	to	emerge	as	the	Chinese	financial	authorities	have	sought	to	facilitate	RMB	
internationalisation	whilst	managing	a	gradual	process	of	capital	account	
liberalisation	and	maintaining	control	of	exchange	rates	(He	and	McCauley	2010).		
These	twin	policy	objectives	have	resulted	in	a	distinctive	geography	of	regulatory	
reform	based	around	a	separation	between	onshore	RMB	markets	(using	the	
currency	designation	CNY)	and	offshore	markets	(understood	as	those	outside	of	
mainland	China)	including	Hong	Kong	(with	the	currency	designation	CNH).			Interest	
and	exchange	rate	controls	remain	in	onshore	RMB	markets	whilst	these	have	been	
liberalised	in	offshore	RMB	markets	(ASIFMA	2014).	This	distinction	echoes	Palan’s	
(2006,	xix)	argument	that	offshore	financial	space	is	constructed	through	processes	
of	re-regulation	as	it	‘becomes	an	embedded	dimension	of	contemporary	
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statehood’.	In	the	case	of	RMB	internationalisation,	offshore	financial	space	is	
organised	through	a	small	number	of	offshore	financial	centres.		Echoing	the	use	of	
Hong	Kong	as	an	experimental	site	for	the	reform	and	internationalisation	of	the	
Chinese	economy	more	generally	(Chen	and	Cheung	2011),	Hong	Kong	became	the	
first	such	centre	in	mid	2010	(Walter	and	Howie	2012).	Since	then,	a	small	number	of	
other	financial	centres	including	Singapore,	Taiwan	and	London	have	developed	
significant	RMB	financial	markets	(Standard	Chartered	2014).		These	offshore	RMB	
centres	can	be	defined	as	a	financial	centre	“outside	[mainland]	China	that	conducts	
a	wide	variety	of	financial	services	denominated	in	RMB”	(ASIFMA	2014,	20)	that	
connects	with	onshore	financial	services	in	mainland	China	(Subacchi	and	Huang	
2012).		
	
As	table	1	shows,	in	addition	to	holding	an	RQFII	quota,	these	centres	host	a	
designated	RMB	clearing	bank,	hold	sizable	(although	varying)	RMB	deposits	and	
have	seen	the	development	of	a	range	of	RMB	markets.		These	centres	are	
supported	by	a	number	of	offshore	financial	RMB	hubs	(such	as	Paris	and	Frankfurt)	
that	access	mainland	China	through	the	offshore	RMB	centres	(Subacchi	and	Huang	
2012).	Hong	Kong	remains	the	largest	offshore	RMB	Centre	and	has	been	the	most	
widely	studied	to	date	(see	Fung	and	Yau	2012).		However,	the	case	of	the	
development	of	London	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre	raises	important	questions	about	
how	and	why	it	became	the	first	western	such	centre	and	the	implications	of	this	for	
the	possible	future	trajectories	of	RMB	internationalisation	and	understandings	of	
IFCs	more	generally.	
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Territorial	fixes	and	the	(re)making	of	regulatory	space	in	London’s	development	as	
an	offshore	RMB	centre	
	
A	central	insight	of	the	recent	resurgence	of	interest	in	territory	has	been	its	
dynamic	qualities	such	that,	in	the	case	of	the	economy,	it	is	constantly	in	the	
process	of	being	refigured	to	achieve	capital	accumulation	therefore	serving	as	what	
Christophers	(2014:745)	terms	a	‘market	making	economic	technology’.		Drawing	on	
this	understanding	of	territory,	in	what	follows	I	being	by	examining	why	London	was	
identified	as	having	the	potential	to	be	developed	as	the	first	western	offshore	RMB	
centre	before	turning	to	how	this	was	achieved	through	state	interventions	by	both	
China	and	the	UK	that	served	to	use	London	as,	in	Christophers	(2014)	terms,	a	
‘territorial	fix’	within	RMB	internationalisation.	
	
Legitimising	London	as	the	‘western	offshore	RMB	centre	of	choice’1	
	
By	taking	the	territorial	qualities	of	London’s	financial	district	as	my	starting	point,	
table	2	specifies	three	sets	of	institutions	that	account	for	why	London	was	identified	
by	the	Chinese	monetary	authorities	as	the	location	for	the	first	western	offshore	
RMB	centre	and	how	this	was	supported	by	both	the	state	and	private	sector	in	
London.		First,	London	specific	conventions,	understood	as	the	socio-cultural	norms	
that	structure	and	shape	what	counts	as	desirable	and	legitimate	financial	activity	in	
the	City	were	instrumental	for	both	Chinese	monetary	authorities	and	policy	makers	
and	the	private	sector	financial	services	community	in	the	UK.		In	particular,	the																																																									
1	Wenjian	Fang,	Chief	executive	Bank	of	China,	London,	cited	in	Euromoney	2014	
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relationship	between	the	temporal	and	geographical	specificity	of	these	conventions	
as	they	operated	in	the	late	2000s	in	the	wake	of	the	2007-8	financial	crisis	and	the	
trajectory	of	RMB	internationalisation	needs	to	be	understood.			
	
Beginning	with	the	creation	of	new	financial	markets	and	products	that	are	clearly	
necessary	if	RMB	finance	is	to	be	developed	in	London,	following	the	2007-8	crisis	
there	was	a	concern	within	both	practitioner	and	policy	making	circles	concerning	
the	potential	for	the	crisis	to	threaten	London’s	position	as	a,	if	not,	the	leading	IFC	
(Hall,	2009).		As	Table	2	shows,	these	concerns	meant	that	London’s	financial	sector	
community,	with	the	support	of	the	UK	Government,	was	particularly	open	to	
experimentation	and	the	associated	development	of	new	forms	of	financial	markets	
‘in	an	effort	to	maintain	it’s	position	as	the	leading	international	financial	centre	
globally’	(Financial	journalist,	China	specialist,	London,	February	2015).		This	is	also	
reflected	in	comments	from	senior	managers	in	leading	investment	banks	made	at	
the	time	
	
	 ‘HSBC	is	fully	committed	and	uniquely	positioned	to	support	the		
internationalisation	of	the	RMB	for	the	benefit	of	China	and	the		
global	economy.	This	initiative	reinforces	London	as	a	leading		
global	financial	centre’	(Spencer	Lake	-	Co-Head	of	Global	Markets,	HSBC,	
cited	City	of	London/Bourse	Consult	2014).	
	
[insert	table	2	here]	
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This	is	related	to	the	second	set	of	conventions	that	were	important	in	London’s	
development	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre,	which	can	be	summarised	as	its	‘genuine	
and	deep	international	disposition’	as	a	junior	Chinese	banker	put	it	to	me	in	April	
2015.		This	reflects	the	fact	that	London,	in	contrast	to	New	York,	has	always	relied	
on	international	financial	services	for	its	development,	given	the	relatively	small	size	
of	its	potential	domestic	market	(Kynaston	2012).		In	particular,	as	Table	2	shows,	
the	British	Government	was	vital	in	facilitating	this	because	under	Prime	Minister	
David	Cameron,	it	was	prepared	to	overlook	concerns	over	China’s	human	rights	
record	in	order	to	facilitate	economic,	and	particularly	financial,	links	with	China	in	
order	to	secure	economic	development	through	the	continued	dominance	of	London	
as	an	IFC	(The	Guardian	2015).		Indeed,	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	at	the	time,	
George	Osborne,	has	been	described	as	a	Sinophile	who	was	particularly	keen	to	
develop	bilateral	economic	agreements	with	China	(Financial	Times	2015b).			
	
The	third	set	of	conventions	that	are	important	in	the	identification	of	London	as	the	
chosen	location	for	the	first	western	offshore	RMB	centre	lies	in	its	close	relational	
proximity	with	both	Hong	Kong	(the	first	offshore	RMB	centre)	and	monetary	
authorities	in	Beijing,	as	shown	in	table	2.	These	connections	are	important	because	
‘they	afforded	a	degree	of	comfort	for	financial	regulators	in	Beijing	that	they	
understood	how	London	worked	and	would	respond	to	their	requests	and	at	least	an	
understanding	of	how	Chinese	finance	might	operate	within	London’s	finance	
community	through	the	close	colonial	based	relations	with	Hong	Kong’,	as	a	capital	
markets	lawyer	working	on	RMB	bonds	put	it	in	March	2015.		This	builds	on	the	
wider	importance	of	this	relational	proximity	for	Chinese	financial	geographies	more	
	 18	
generally.		For	example,	Lai	(2011)	has	argued	that	London	served	as	a	preferred	
‘learning	partner’	for	the	restructuring	of	the	Chinese	banking	system	because	of	the	
close	personal	and	social	networks	between	senior	policymakers	in	Beijing	and	their	
UK	counterparts.	
	
However,	whilst	these	conventions	within	London	and	the	role	of	state	and	
policymaker	support	for	them	from	both	Beijing	and	the	UK	clearly	played	an	
important	role	in	the	legitimation	of	London	as	the	first	western	offshore	RMB	
centre,	as	Table	2	shows,	it	is	important	to	note	that	more	standard	institutional	
attributes	identified	in	the	literature	on	the	success	of	London	as	an	IFC	and	the	
external	economies	of	scale	that	is	offers	were	also	important.		In	this	respect,	
London’s	time	zone,	facilitating	24	hour	trading	with	overseas	counterparts,	its	
historic	reliance	on	foreign	exchange	markets	and	its	deep	and	dense	pool	of	highly	
skilled	labour	have	all	been	identified	in	the	policy	literature	surrounding	RMB	
internationalisation,	echoing	the	considerable	literature	in	geography	that	has	
developed	to	explain	London’s	continued	importance	as	an	international	financial	
centre	(Clifford	Chance	2012;	Thrift	1994;	see	also	table	1.)	For	example	the	
importance	of	time	zones	in	determining	the	location	and	relative	success	of	
offshore	RMB	centres	is	reflected	in	the	announcement	made	by	the	Bank	of	China	
in	Hong	Kong	in	August	2014	that	from	1	October	2014	it	would	extend	the	hours	it	
offered	RMB	clearing	services	in	Hong	Kong	in	order	to	cover	the	time	zones	of	
Europe	and	America	as	well	as	Asia	(Bank	of	China	2014).			
Finally,	the	third	dimension	of	London’s	institutional	landscape	that	was	important	in	
facilitating	its	initial	development	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre	was	its	approach	to	
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regulation,	and	particularly	the	use	of	regulatory	changes	to	facilitate	the	
development	of	offshore	markets	historically	through	the	development	Eurodollar	
markets	in	the	1960s	and	70s	(Subacchi	and	Huang	2012).	Crucial	to	the	
development	of	Euro	bond	markets	in	London	was	the	combination	of	regulatory	
change	and	the	ways	in	which	financial	institutions	sought	to	work	within	this	
changing	environment	whilst	also	shaping	it	in	ways	most	advantageous	to	their	own	
ends	(in	other	words,	remaking	the	territorial	qualities	of	London’s	financial	district	
at	the	time	(Burn	1999;	Schenk	1999).	There	are	clear	differences	between	the	Euro-
dollar	markets	and	offshore	RMB	centres,	not	least	the	far	more	interventionist	role	
played	by	the	Chinese	state	in	the	latter	compared	with	the	US	government	in	the	
former,	such	that	financial	authorities	in	London	are	responding	to	regulations	made	
at	a	distance,	rather	than	shaping	the	process	themselves	as	was	the	case	in	
Eurodollar	markets	(Subacchi	2014).		However,	the	existence	of	euro-dollar	markets	
in	London	was	taken	as	evidence	of	London’s	ability	and	willingness	to	make	
regulatory	changes	to	develop	offshore	markets,	reflecting	its	wider	expertise	in	
foreign	exchange	markets	as	shown	in	Table	2.	
	
Taken	together,	these	institutional	dimensions	of	London’s	financial	district	explain	
why	it	was	selected	as	the	first	offshore	RMB	centre.		They	also	show	how	these	
territorial	qualities	of	London	as	an	IFC	are	tied	into	relations	with	both	the	Chinese	
and	British	states,	particularly	through	financial	and	monetary	authorities.		However,	
in	order	to	understand	how	London	subsequently	developed	as	an	offshore	RMB	
centre,	it	is	necessary	to	examine	how	the	territorial	qualities	of	London’s	financial	
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district	were	(re)produced	through	regulatory	change	initiated	by	both	China	and	the	
UK.		
	
Territorial	fixes	in	the	making	of	offshore	RMB	markets	in	London	
	
Three	sets	of	relations,	that	combine	multi	scalar	relations	beyond	the	boundaries	of	
London’s	financial	district,	are	particularly	important	in	understanding	how	financial	
space	in	London	was	(re)produced	in	an	effort	to	use	it	to	provide	a	territorial	fix	for	
monetary	authorities	and	the	financial	services	sector	concerned	with	the	
development	of	RMB	financial	markets:	first,	Annual	UK-China	Economic	and	
Financial	Dialogues;	second	the	City	of	London	Initiative	on	London	as	a	centre	for	
RMB	business;	and	third,	the	London-Hong	Kong	RMB	forum.		Below	I	consider	each	
of	these	in	turn.	
	
Beginning	with	the	annual	UK-China	Economic	and	Financial	Dialogues	these	have	
taken	place	primarily	at	the	level	of	deputy	prime	minister	annual	since	2007.		The	
significance	of	these	dialogues	is	two	fold.		At	one	level,	they	serve	as	a	platform	to	
announce	key	regulatory	changes,	predominately	from	Beijing	but	also	from	the	UK’s	
monetary	authorities,	that	have	facilitated	the	development	of	RMB	markets	in	
London.		However,	at	another	level,	they	also	serve	an	important	discursive	role	in	
the	careful	performance	of	close	economic	and	financial	relations	between	the	UK	
and	China	that	are	used	by	both	sides	to	demonstrate	their	commitment	to	the	place	
of	London	within	RMB	internationalisation.		The	fifth	and	sixth	dialogues	are	
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particularly	important	because	these	meetings	signalled	a	marked	acceleration	in	the	
pace	and	scale	of	London’s	development	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre	(see	figure	2).		
	
[insert	figure	2	here]		
	
The	fifth	UK-China	Economic	and	financial	dialogue	was	held	in	Beijing	in	October	
2013	between	the	Chinese	Vice	Premier	Ma	Kai	and	the	UK’s	Chancellor	of	the	
Exchequer	George	Osborne.	At	this	meeting,	a	joint	commitment	was	made	to	
facilitate	liquidity	of	RMB	in	London	building	on	the	currency	swap	arrangement	in	
2013	between	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	People’s	Bank	of	China.2		It	was	also	
announced	that	UK	institutions	would	be	given	licenses	within	the	RQFII	(Renminbi	
Qualified	Foreign	Institutional	Investor)	scheme	before	the	end	of	2013	with	an	
initial	UK	quota	of	RMB	80billion	issued	to	London	in	October	2013.		This	is	
significant	within	the	wider	project	of	RMB	internationalisation	and	the	place	of	
London	within	it	because	the	scheme	allows	foreign	investors	to	invest	offshore	RMB	
raised	in	designated	financial	centres	into	Chinese	securities	for	the	first	time	and	
London	was	the	first	such	centre	outside	greater	China	to	be	issued	with	a	quota.				
	
The	UK’s	monetary	authorities	sought	to	respond	to	this	demonstration	of	Beijing’s	
commitment	to	London	through	their	own	regulatory	changes.		Most	notably,	it	was	
agreed	that	the	Bank	of	England	would	agree	to	consider	applications	from	Chinese	
																																																								2	See	the	combined	policy	outcomes	of	the	5th	China-UK	Economic	and	Finance	
dialogue	available	from	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/25
0003/UK_Chinese_EFD_outcomes_paper.pdf.	
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Banks	to	open	branches	rather	than	subsidiaries	in	the	UK.		Up	until	this	point,	the	
development	of	Chinese	banks	in	London	was	characterised	by	a	cautious	approach,	
following	the	2007-8	financial	crisis,	with	only	subsidiaries	permitted	to	open	with	
their	associated	higher	capital	and	liquidity	requirements.	However,	this	met	with	
significant	concern	from	the	Chinese	banking	industry,	echoing	research	that	has	
demonstrated	how	firms	from	emerging	markets	such	as	China	seek	out	
internationalisation	opportunities	in	part	to	overcome	regulatory	constraints	in	their	
home	market	(Luo	and	Tung	2007).		For	example,	in	a	letter	to	HM	Treasury	in	2012	
the	Association	of	Foreign	Banks	argued	that	‘they	[Chinese	banks]	are	finding	it	
increasingly	difficult	to	operate	in	the	UK	under	the	current	regulatory	environment’.		
This	changed	in	June	2014	when	it	was	announced	that	Industrial	and	Commercial	
Bank	of	China	would	be	given	a	full	banking	licence	in	London	by	the	end	of	2014.	
The	Chinese	bank	ICBC	welcomed	this	in	their	annual	report	arguing	that	
	
 
‘The	most	welcome	[outcome	of	the	Fifth	Dialogue]	was	the	announcement	
in	October	by	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	that	the	Prudential	Regulation	
Authority	will	allow	our	Chinese	banks	to	establish	branches	in	London	as	
soon	as	the	regulatory	details	have	been	agreed.	This	is	something	for	which	
we	have	campaigned	for	some	time.	In	ICBC	(London)	plc,	as	a	locally	
constituted	subsidiary,	we	are	constrained	in	our	lending	by	the	amount	of	
our	local	capital.’	(ICBC	London	2013,	5).	
	
Building	on	these	developments,	at	the	sixth	dialogue	held	in	London	in	September	
2014,	it	was	recognised	that	‘the	London	RMB	market	[…]	is	at	the	forefront	of	RMB	
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business	among	European	countries’.3	This	position	was	reflected	in	a	number	of	
important	announcements	concerning	regulatory	changes	aimed	at	enhancing	
London’s	role	in	RMB	internationalisation.		Most	notably	in	June	2014	China	
Construction	Bank	was	named	as	the	renminbi	clearing	bank	in	London.	As	in	
previous	meetings,	the	importance	of	this	announcement	from	Beijing	was	reflected	
in	regulatory	changes	made	in	London	in	order	to	take	advantage	of	Beijing’s	
continued	commitment	to	London.	For	example,	it	was	agreed	that	the	Financial	
Conduct	Authority’s	Approved	Persons	Regime	for	asset	management	and	other	
regulated	activity	(a	de	facto	register	of	financiers	who	are	eligible	to	offer	financial	
advice	in	the	UK)	did	not	include	a	nationality	restriction	and	hence,	Chinese	finance	
professionals	would	be	welcome	in	the	City.	Meanwhile,	in	terms	of	bonds,	it	was	
announced	that	China	Construction	Bank	intended	to	issue	an	RMB	bond	in	London	
and	the	UK	government	announced	its	intention	to	issue	a	RMB	denominated	bond	
in	London.	As	a	result	of	these	changes,	London	has	rapidly	risen	to	being	widely	
recognised	as	the	leading	western	offshore	RMB	centre.		For	example,	by	the	end	of	
2013,	62%	of	all	RMB	trading	conducted	outside	China	and	Hong	Kong	took	place	in	
London	and	the	City	handles	nearly	30%	of	all	RMB	foreign	exchange	trading	(FSTIB	
2014).			
	
The	commitment	of	the	UK	Government	under	David	Cameron	and	George	Osborne	
to	support	London’s	development	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre	is	further	
																																																								3	See	the	combined	policy	outcomes	of	the	6th	China-UK	Economic	and	Finance	
dialogue	available	from	
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/35
4137/UK-China_policy_outcomes.pdf,	
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demonstrated	by	the	UK	government	becoming	the	first	western	country	to	issue	
debt	in	RMB	when	it	raised	3bn	RMB	in	2014	in	what	was	the	largest	ever	RMB	bond	
(Moore	and	Noble	2014).	Whilst	the	issuance	itself	is	comparatively	small,	it	is	
symbolically	important	for	RMB	internationalisation	generally	but	also	for	
demonstrating	the	UK	Government’s	commitment	to	developing	London	as	an	
offshore	RMB	centre.	It	is	also	was	indicative	of	the	diversification	of	investor	origins	
within	RMB	bond	markets	with	57%	of	investors	being	Asian	and	43%	European	(Li	
2014).		
	
The	remaking	of	London’s	territorial	space	through	offshore	RMB	finance	has	not	
been	limited	to	bilateral	state	relations.		London’s	monetary	authorities	have	also	
sought	to	develop	London’s	RMB	offshore	financial	centre	credentials,	most	notably	
through	the	creation	in	April	2012	of	the	City	of	London	Initiative	on	London	as	a	
Centre	for	RMB	business.		This	initiative	aims	‘to	consider	practical	measures	to	
support	the	development	of	London	as	a	centre	for	RMB	business’	as	well	as	advising	
HMTreasury	on	the	issues	facing	London	in	its	development	as	an	RMB	centre.		
Following	work	on	the	relations	of	both	competition	and	cooperation	emphasised	in	
much	of	the	research	on	IFCs	in	economic	geography	and	the	relational	proximity	
between	London	and	greater	China	more	generally,	this	initiative	was	also	designed	
to	learn	from	Hong	Kong	regulators	about	their	experience	of	developing	an	RMB	
centre	(see	for	example	City	of	London/Bourse	Consult	2014).	To	this	end,	members	
of	the	initiative	are	representatives	from	leading	financial	institutions	that	have	
offices	in	London	and	Hong	Kong	including	Bank	of	China	(UK),	HSBC,	China	
Construction	Bank	(UK)	and	Barclays.		This	membership	reveals	the	ways	in	which	
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London	sought	to	develop	its	expertise	in	RMB	business	by	drawing	on	its	historic	
strengths	as	an	international	financial	with	strong	links	to	Hong	Kong,	fostered	
through	private	sector	collaboration	amongst	banks	and	financial	service	firms.		The	
Initiative	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	these	corporate	networks	can	act	as	
pipelines	(Bathelt	et	al	2004)	of	knowledge	sharing	and	learning	such	that	the	
corporate	experiences	of	Hong	Kong’s	development	as	the	first	and	leading	offshore	
RMB	centre	can	be	used	to	inform	London’s	development.		
	
Indeed,	the	combination	of	private	sector	and	state	support	that	underpins	London’s	
development	as	an	RMB	centre	is	further	evidenced	by	the	London-Hong	Kong	RMB	
forum	that	has	met	three	times	in	order	to	raise	awareness	of	RMB	markets	amongst	
financial	market	participants	since	its	foundation	in	May	2012.		This	forum	involves	
meetings	between	UK	treasury	officials,	the	Hong	Kong	Monetary	Authority	and	
representatives	of	banks	and	financial	institutions	involved	in	RMB	markets	in	
London	and	Hong	Kong	(see,	for	example,	HKMA	2013).		The	purpose	of	these	
meetings	is	to	share	information	between	firms	in	Hong	Kong	and	London	as	well	as	
ensure	that	policy	makers	and	regulators	are	aware	of	their	requirements.		For	
example,	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	Hong	Kong	Monetary	Authority	typically	act	as	
facilitators	at	these	meetings.		
	
These	developments	show	the	strong	commitment	of	policymakers	and	regulators	in	
both	Beijing	and	London	to	using	the	remaking	of	financial	space	through	regulatory	
change	in	London’s	financial	district	as	a	way	of	facilitating	the	development	of	
London	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre.		However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	significant	
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concerns	exist	surrounding	the	on	going	development	of	London’s	RMB	activities.	
The	most	high	profile	of	these	has	been	how	the	Brexit	vote	in	the	UK’s	referendum	
on	EU	membership	in	June	2015	may	affect	China’s	commitment	to	London	as	its	
western	offshore	centre	of	choice	(South	China	Morning	Post,	2016).		Meanwhile,	
there	are	indications	that	the	new	Prime	Minister	installed	after	this	vote,	Theresa	
May,	is	less	concerned	with	fostering	relations	with	China	in	the	name	of	economic	
development	than	her	predecessor	(BBC	2016).		Moreover,	prior	to	the	2015	
referendum	there	was	evidence	that	London’s	development	as	an	offshore	RMB	
centre	was	not	without	its	problems.		For	example,	within	Europe	it	was	facing	
competition	from	a	number	of	centres,	particularly	Luxembourg	(Strauss	2014);	the	
much	heralded	Chinese	bank	branches	had	not	been	fully	integrated	into	London’s	
financial	district	(Hall	2015)	and	the	RQFII	quota	remained	significantly	under	utilised	
(SWIFT	2014).		These	developments	clearly	remind	us	that	the	process	of	RMB	
internationalisation,	and	the	development	of	offshore	RMB	centres	within	this,	is	not	
straightforward	or	necessarily	linear	in	nature.		However,	they	also	signal	the	
continued	role	of	inter-state	relations	in	shaping	this	process	in	ways	that	echo	the	
wider	arguments	made	in	this	paper.	
	
Conclusions	
	
RMB	internationalisation	has	been	identified	as	the	most	important	process	shaping	
the	international	financial	system	since	the	creation	of	the	Euro	(Deutsche	Bank	
2014).	However,	academic	work	in	the	area	remains	focused	on	the	potential	
outcomes	of	such	a	process	including:	the	possibility	of	the	RMB	challenging	the	US	
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dollar	as	a	new	global	reserve	currency	(Cohen	2012;	Lee	2014);	the	relationship	
between	currency	internationalisation	and	the	‘opening	up’	of	the	Chinese	economy	
(Dobson	and	Masson	2009);	and	the	changing	financial	geographies	of	China		(Lim	
2010;	Wójcik	and	Camilleri	2013).		As	such	relatively	little	is	known	about	the	
distinctive	geography	of	RMB	internationalisation	as	it	develops	through	a	unique	
network	of	offshore	RMB	centres.		Addressing	this	oversight,	this	paper	has	sought	
to	place	RMB	internationalisation	more	centrally	within	scholarship	on	the	
geographies	of	money	and	finance,	and	work	on	IFCs	in	particular.		However,	rather	
than	examining	RMB	internationalisation	through	its	heartlands,	notably	Hong	Kong,	
or	the	debates	within	mainstream	economics	concerning	the	RMB’s	potential	to	
become	the	global	reserve	currency,	the	paper	has	taken	inspiration	from	Burawoy’s	
(1998)	work	on	the	extended	case	method	to	examine	RMB	internationalisation	
through	the	less	well	studied	case	of	London’s	development	as	an	offshore	RMB	
centre.	In	so	doing,	the	analysis	has	shown	that	by	examining	a	relatively	new	
process	(RMB	internationalisation)	within	a	more	familiar	geographical	setting	
(London’s	financial	district)	important	theoretical	and	empirical	insights	can	be	
developed	into	RMB	internationalisation	and	the	role	and	nature	of	financial	centres	
within	this.		
	
Theoretically,	I	have	argued	that	London’s	development	as	the	first	western	offshore	
RMB	centre	offers	a	sympathetic	critique	of	the	recent	tendency	to	understand	IFCs	
through	networked	geographical	imaginations.		This	work	has	done	much	to	helps	us	
understand	the	relations	between	IFCs,	emphasising	how	these	are	mediated	
through	finance	and	related	professional	service	firms.		However,	the	case	of	RMB	
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internationalisation	calls	for	a	shift	in	these	geographical	imaginations	to	examine	
the	territorial	qualities	and	reproduction	of	IFCs.		In	particular,	I	have	emphasised	
the	role	of	the	state,	and	monetary	and	financial	authorities	in	particular,	as	they	
seek	to	use	regulatory	changes	as	a	way	of	using	IFCs	as	a	‘territorial	fix’	to	meet	
their	political	and	economic	objectives	within	the	international	financial	system.		
However,	rather	than	dismissing	the	importance	of	financial	networks	between	IFCs,	
this	approach	adopts	a	multi	scalar	reading	of	territory	and	is	concerned	with	a	
longstanding	set	of	debates	in	economic	geography	and	the	wider	social	sciences	
concerning	the	co-constitutive	relationship	between	territories	and	networks	and	
the	ways	in	which	territory	itself	is	remade	in	this	process	(see	Sassen	2008;	Dicken	
et	al	2001	for	example).		I	have	argued	that,	in	the	case	of	RMB	internationalisation,	
London’s	financial	district	offered	precisely	such	a	territorial	fix	in	Christophers’	
(2014)	terms	or	what	Elden	(2010)	terms	a	‘political	technology’	that	combines	both	
territorial	and	networked	understandings	of	London.		On	the	one	hand,	for	Chinese	
monetary	authorities,	London	served	as	a	financial	centre	capable	of	meeting	their	
objectives	of	furthering	RMB	internationalisation	into	Europe.	Meanwhile,	for	their	
UK	counterparts,	making	regulatory	changes	to	support	RMB	internationalisation	in	
London	was	undertaken	as	part	of	wider	efforts	to	maintain	London’s	position	as	an	
IFC	in	the	wake	of	the	2007-8	financial	crisis	within	a	wider	political	concern	to	
nurture	close	relationships	with	China	in	the	hope	that	they	would	foster	economic	
growth	more	generally.	
	
In	some	ways,	the	emphasis	on	the	state	that	emerges	in	the	case	of	RMB	
internationalisation	may	seem	rather	unsurprising	given	the	nature	of	the	Chinese	
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political	economy.		However,	I	would	suggest	that	this	is	analytically	useful	since	the	
case	of	RMB	internationalisation	can	serve	as	an	accentuated	case	to	demonstrate	
the	importance	of	attending	to	the	role	of	state	actors,	both	within	and	beyond	IFCs	
in	facilitating	and	shaping	their	(re)production	more	generally.		In	particular,	the	
different	institutions	and	conventions	shaped	by	state	intervention	within	London’s	
RMB	markets	identified	within	this	paper	(ranging	from	taken	for	granted	cultural	
norms	to	more	formal	regulatory	changes)	provide	a	valuable	framework	for	
specifying	how	state	actors	shape	the	territoriality	of	IFCs.		In	this	sense,	finance	in	
this	paper	can	be	conceived	of	as	a	political	relation,	alongside	the	economic,	
cultural	and	social	relations	that	have	dominated	work	on	IFCs	of	late.		This	is	
important	because	it	demands	that	questions	are	asked	about	in	whose	interests	the	
state	is	acting	when	it	shapes	IFCs	in	this	way.		Indeed,	these	questions	are	
particularly	pertinent	in	the	case	of	the	UK	where	there	is	a	growing	recognition	that	
London’s	financial	services	sector	enjoys	a	privileged	position	within	the	UK	political	
economy,	often	at	the	expense	of	other	regions	and	industries,	particularly	as	Prime	
Minister	David	Cameron	and	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer	George	Osborne	
actively	pursued	closer	economic	links	with	China	through	what	The	Economist	
(2015)	termed	‘The	Osborne	Doctrine’.		
	
In	a	more	empirical	vein,	the	approach	taken	in	the	paper	offers	a	nuanced	reading	
of	RMB	internationalisation.		Here	I	argue	that	it	is	not	a	straightforward,	linear	and	
predictable	process	that	has	one	predetermined	end	point,	notably	the	possible	
development	of	the	RMB	as	a	global	reserve	currency	that	has	been	the	focus	of	
much	of	the	academic	debate	on	RMB	internationalisation	to	date.	Rather,	offshore	
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RMB	space	is	being	(re)produced	in	London	through	the	interplay	of	relations	with	
other	IFCs,	notably	Hong	Kong,	the	place	of	London’s	financial	district	including	its	
accepted	socio-economic	norms	and	the	territorial	qualities	of	London’s	financial	
district	as	it	is	(re)produced	through	regulatory	changed	initiated	by	financial	
authorities	in	both	Beijing	and	London.		How	these	elements	are	combined	in	
particular	offshore	RMB	centres	and	hubs	and	how	they	interact	with	the	
institutional,	political	and	cultural	make	up	of	these	places	is	likely	to	be	important	in	
explaining	the	future	trajectories	of	RMB	internationalisation	and	its	broader	role	in	
shaping	the	continued	variegation	within	the	geographies	of	money	and	finance.	
	
This	analysis	is	also	valuable	in	terms	of	demonstrating	the	changing	and	increasingly	
important	role	of	offshore	spaces	and	places	within	the	international	financial	
system.		There	has	been	a	renewed	interest	in	offshore	finance	within	economic	
geography	and	cognate	social	sciences	recently	(see	for	example	Clark	et	al	2015;	
Wójcik	2013;	Haberly	and	Wójcik	2015).		This	work	has	gone	beyond	earlier	research	
that	focused	on	small,	island	economies	(Roberts	1995).		Rather	it	draws	attention	to	
the	growing	range	of	offshore	activity	and	a	concomitant	diversity	in	the	places	in	
which	it	takes	place.		Indeed,	it	is	well	documented	that	China’s	financial	system	is	
tied	into	a	series	of	offshore	financial	networks	(Sharman	2012).		The	analysis	in	this	
paper	makes	important	interventions	in	this	work	by	complicating	the	separation	
between	on	and	offshore	finance,	revealing	the	ways	in	which	through	relational,	
place	and	territorial	practices,	significant	new	forms	of	offshore	finance	are	being	
(re)produced	in	established	IFCs	with	important	implications	for	the	future	trajectory	
of	the	international	financial	system.		Such	insights	are	important	not	only	in	terms	
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of	understanding	offshore	finance	in	and	of	itself	but	also	in	terms	of	contributing	to	
a	renewed	interest	in	the	politics	of	global	finance	and	the	role	of	financial	centres	
within	this.	
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Table	1	Attributes	of	leading	offshore	RMB	centres	
Financial	
services	
activity	
Hong	Kong	 Singapore	 Taiwan	 London	
RMB	deposits	
(RMB	bn)	
827	 172	 123	 15	
Clearing	Bank	 BOC	HK	 ICBC	SG	 BOC	TW	 China	Construction	Bank	
RQFII	quota	
(RMB	bn),	
(date	of	initial	
allocation)	
270	
(2011)	
50	
(2013)	
100	
(proposed)	
80	
(2014)	
RMB	services	 Retail	and	commercial	banking	
Foreign	Exchange	
Primary	and	secondary	RMB	securities	
market	
RMB	trade	facilitation	
Retail	and	commercial	banking	
Foreign	Exchange	
Broad	financial	market	products	
RMB	trade	facilitation	
	
Retail	and	commercial	banking	
Limited	financial	market	
products	
RMB	trade	facilitation	
	
Foreign	exchange	
Limited	financial	market	products	
Limited	retail	and	commercial	
banking	
Key	
advantages	
Gateway	to	mainland	Chinese	markets	
Strong	existing	financial	centre	
infrastructure	
ASEAN	financial	hub	
Strong	existing	financial	centre	
infrastructure	
Hub	for	regional	treasury	and	
commodity	traders	
Strong	asset	management	market	
with	wide	investor	pool	
Strong	trade	links	
Large	deposit	base	with	need	to	
cross	border	remittances	
European	time	zone	
World’s	leading	foreign	exchange	
centre	
Strong	existing	financial	
infrastructure	
Focus	markets	 Greater	China	regional	treasury	centre	
Pilot	schemes	and	new	product	
development	
Dim	sum	bond	market	
South	Asia	Regional	Trade	Centre	
Commodities	centre	
Private	banking	
Domestic/Cross-strait	RMB	
usage	
Global	treasury	centre,	global	
foreign	exchange	trading,	asset	
management	
	
Source:	Adapted	from	ASIFMA	2014	using	author’s	research
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Figure	1	Monetary	form,	geographical	reach	and	policy	basis	of	RMB	internationalisation	
	
	
	
Source:	adapted	from	Swift	2011	using	author’s	research	
Policy	
liberalisa^on	
• 2002	Qualiﬁed	
Foreign	
Insitu^onal	
Investors	(QFII)		
can	buy	and	sell	
RMB	shares	in	
China	
• 2004	Personal	
RMB	business	
banking		
permaed	in	
Honk	Kong	and	
Macau	
Regionalisa^on	
RMB	trade	money	
• 2007	debt	capital	
market	for	RMB	
denominated	
bonds	(dim	sum	
bonds)	launched	
in	Hong	Kong	
• 2008	Currency	
swap	agreement	
between	China	
and	South	Korea	
• 2009	RMB	cross	
border	trade	
sealement	with	
Hong	Kong,	
Macau	and	
ASEAN	countries	
Interna^onalisa^on	
RMB	investment	
money	
• 2010	RMB	trade	
sealement	with	
any	corporate	
globally	
• 2010	Investment	
in	China	
interbank	bonds	
• 2011	Renminbi	
Qualiﬁed	Foreign	
Ins^tu^onal	
Investor	Scheme	
(RQFII)	can	invest	
in	mainland	
China	
Network	of	oﬀshore	
RMB	centres	
Diversiﬁca^on	of	
RMB	monetary	
forms	
	
• Development	of	
dim	sum	bond	
market	beyond	
Hong	Kong	
(London,	2012)	
• 2013	London	
given	ini^al	RMB	
quota	of	80bn	
RMB	
• 2014	China	
Construc^on	
Bank	named	as	
RMB	clearing	
bank	in	London	
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Figure	2	Timeline	of	London’s	development	as	an	offshore	RMB	centre	
	
Source:		adapted	from	Ying	(2013:	12-13)	using	author’s	research
2011	
Sept	
4th	UK-China	Economic	and	
Financial	Dialogue.	Oﬃcially	
welcomes	private	sector	led	
development	of	RMB	market	in	
London	
Dec	
City	of	London	ini^a^ve	on	
London	as	centre	for	RMB	
business	established	
2012	
Jan	
UK	Chancellor	and	Chief	execu^ve	
of	Hong	Kong	Monetary	Authority	
announce	co-opera^on	of	oﬀshore	
RMB	business	
Oct	
UK	Government	issued	RMB	
bond	on	LSE.	First	non	Chinese	
issuance	of	sovereign	RMB	debt	
April	
First	RMB	bond	issuance	outside	
Hong	Kong	and	mainland	China	by	
HSBC	in	London	
2013	
Oct	
5th	UK-China	Economic	and	
Financial	Dialogue.	Chinese	bank	
branch	applica^ons	to	be	
considered	in	UK.	London	given	
RMB80Bn	RQFII	quota	
June	
China	Construc^on	Bank	named	
as	London	RMB	clearing	house	
2014	
Dec		
ICBC	ﬁrst	mainland	Chinese	
bank	to	obtain	PRA	banking	
license	
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Table	2:	Factors	accounting	for	the	identification	of	London	as	the	first	western	offshore	RMB	centre	
	
Institutional	form	 Specific	attribute	 Indicative	example	from	research	interviews	
City	specific	
conventions	
Propensity	for	financial	market	
innovation	
“There	was	definitely	a	period	in	the	2010s	when	the	City	[of	London]	needed	to	think	about	new	
markets	to	try	to	cement	its	position	as	the	leading	financial	centre	–	there	was	interest	in	carbon	
markets	for	example	but	RMB	finance	was	also	definitely	identified	as	an	option	which	had	strong	
Government	support”	
(Capital	markets	lawyer,	London,	March	2015)	
	 International	outlook	 “London	is	an	international	centre	in	ways	that	places	like	New	York	and	even	Singapore	aren’t	
really.		You	can	see	this	in	its	pre-eminence	in	foreign	exchange	trading,	but	in	less	clear	measures	
like	its	outlook,	the	international	origin	of	the	financial	institutions	here	and	the	backgrounds	of	
the	people	working	here.	That	makes	it	an	obvious	destination	for	RMB	markets”	
(Vice	president,	Chinese	commercial	bank,	London,	June	2015)			
	 Relational	proximity	between	
China	and	the	UK	
“London	has	particular	advantages	that	make	it	the	obvious	choice	for	an	RMB	hub	in	Europe.		It	is	
obviously	the	leading	financial	centre	in	the	region,	but	its	location	makes	working	with	Beijing	
easier,	it	has	close	links	with	Hong	Kong	and	Beijing	that	can	be	drawn	upon	to	build	successful	
RMB	markets	and	it	has	the	specific	experience	of	developing	offshore	[euro-dollar]	markets”	
(Banking	Associate,	Chinese	commercial	banks,	Beijing	December	2014)		
External	economies	
of	scale	available	to	
financial	institutions	
in	London	
Market	Liquidity	and	
associated	labour	market	
expertise	
“The	depth	of	the	market	in	London	and	the	associated	expertise	in	developing	new	markets,	from	
financiers	and	lawyers	makes	London	an	obvious	choice	(to	develop	RMB	markets)	compared	to	
other	centres”		
(Bank	vice	president,	Chinese	Commercial	bank,	London,	February	2015)	
Regulatory	
environment	
Comparatively	deregulated,	
flexible	financial	milieu	
“The	development	of	the	euro	dollar	market	in	London	[in	the	1960s]	demonstrates	that	the	City	is	
prepared	to	use	favourable	regulation	to	stimulate	new	markets	and	that	is	certainly	attractive	to	
the	Chinese	monetary	authorities”	
(Financial	journalist,	China	desk,	London,	March	2015)	
	
Source:	Author’s	fieldwork	
	
